Attacking Women or their Policies?

Understanding Violence against Women in Politics

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Motivation

Two important trends have been observed across countries:

1. Higher presence of women in politics, although the gender gap persists.
   - 25% of parliamentary seats worldwide (IPU, 2023).
2. Surge in political polarization, violence, and persisting discrimination against underrepresented groups, including women

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Potentially troubling consequences:

- If gender-based discrimination turns into violent backlash, this may contribute to higher overall violence in politics.
- Violent backlash may discourage women from running for office, making it harder to bridge the existing gender gap in representation.

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3. Nor on the effect of attacks on women political careers.

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2. Motives behind attacks.
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3. Effect of attacks on women political careers.
   - → Measure the consequence of attacks.

Data

Data

Data on Violence against Politicians

We digitize the yearly reports by the NGO *Avviso Pubblico* ▸ More :
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- Detailed: date, municipality, victim, type of attack,
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- Includes both threats and violence. ▸Types ▸Targets

- Indicates when attacks are denounced by the victim(s) or
  confirmed by the police, allowing us to test for reporting bias.

Is there a Gender Gap in Violence?

Close Elections RDD

$$Attacks_{i,t} = \tau_t + \phi_r + \theta X'_{i,t-1} + \beta FMayor_{i,t} + \gamma f(FMargin)_{i,t} +$$
$$+ \lambda FMayor \times f(FMargin)_{i,t} + \epsilon_{i,t}$$

Local 1st order polynomial with data-driven bandwidth (Calonico et al., 2014) and robust, bias-corrected SEs.

Close Elections RDD

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Validity checks:

1. Tests of no-sorting assumption. ▸ Go
2. Balance of covariates at cutoff. ▸ Go
3. Other characteristics of female mayors.

Female Mayors Not a Compound Treatment

Notes: Dependent variables are standardized.

Gender Gap in Violence

Female Mayors Are 3 Times As Likely to Be Attacked

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	≥ 1 Attack		Ln(Attacks)		InvHSin(Attacks)	
Female Mayor	.100***	.106***	.079***	.087***	.102***	.111***
	(.036)	(.034)	(.030)	(.027)	(.038)	(.034)
Mean Depvar	.057	.057	.045	.049	.058	.065
SD Depvar	.233	.232	.198	.209	.255	.274
Region FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Bandwidth	18.62	18.72	17.56	19.00	17.55	19.47
Effective N	1,304	1,272	1,234	1,293	1,233	1,312
N Left	767	748	722	763	722	776
N Right	537	524	512	530	511	536

Controls: Log surface, log longitude, log latitude, log elevation, log distance from regional capital, log population, log population density, log foreigners per 100 inhabitants, indicator for provincial capital, average age, % high school educated, unemployment rate, % employed in agriculture, mafia-presence index (2006), vote share in women related referenda, turnout and vote share of the right-wing coalition in the most recent parliamentary election.

▸ TWFE Results

Placebo and Robustness Tests

1. Differential reporting. ▸ Go

2. Placebo with other victims. ▸ Go

3. Placebo with lag of attacks. ▸ Go

4. Placebo with irrelevant cutoffs. ▸ Go

5. Robustness to bandwidth choice. ▸ Go

6. Robustness to dependent variable in levels. ▸ Go

7. Excluding one region at a time. ▸ Go

8. Excluding one election year at a time. ▸ Go

Explaining Violence Against Women in Politics

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1. **Agency:** Reaction against women's policies <small>(Chattopadyay and Duflo, 2004; Alesina and La Ferrara, 2005; Pande and Ford, 2009)</small> and behavior while in office <small>(Brollo and Troiano, 2016; Baskaran and Hessami, 2019)</small>

Explaining Violence Against Women in Politics

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2. **Identity:** Backlash against outgroup becoming empowered economically, demographically, or politically (Dugan and Chenoweth, 2020; Cikara et al., 2022; Zonszein and Grossman, 2022).

Explaining the Gender Differential in Attacks

Agency?

Policymaking

- Collect data on expenditures of municipal governments.
- Test RDD for women election on spending choices.

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- Test RDD for women election on spending choices.
- Female mayors do not spend differently

Panel A: Log Per Capita Expenditures

▸ Only Year 1   ▸ Share Total Exp   ▸ They don't perform better or worse

Excluding Attacks w/ Policy Motivation

- Code whether attacks are driven by policy and exclude them from analyses.

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	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	≥ 1 Attack		Ln(Attacks)		InvHSin(Attacks)	
Female Mayor	.099***	.109***	.078***	.088***	.100***	.112***
(RDD coeff)	(.034)	(.033)	(.029)	(.027)	(.037)	(.035)
Mean Depvar	.054	.054	.045	.045	.058	.057
SD Depvar	.226	.226	.199	.199	.257	.255
Region FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Bandwidth	17.19	16.82	16.77	16.78	16.74	16.91
Effective N	1,209	1,151	1,181	1,148	1,180	1,155
N Left	705	665	683	663	682	668
N Right	504	486	498	485	498	487

Controls: Log surface, log longitude, log latitude, log elevation, log distance from regional capital, log population, log population density, log foreigners per 100 inhabitants, indicator for provincial capital, average age, % high school educated, unemployment rate, % employed in agriculture, mafia-presence index (2006), vote share in women related referenda, turnout and vote share of the right-wing coalition in the most recent parliamentary election.

Not Driven by Political Ideology

	(1) *Left-Wing*	(2) *Right-Wing*
Female Mayor	.201***	.140**
(RDD coeff)	(.076)	(.060)
Mean Depvar	.111	.040
SD Depvar	.318	.197
Region FEs	Yes	Yes
Controls	No	Yes
Bandwidth	11.70	12.94
Effective N	105	187
N Left	45	124
N Right	60	63

Controls: Log surface, log longitude, log latitude, log elevation, log distance from regional capital, log population, log population density, log foreigners per 100 inhabitants, indicator for provincial capital, average age, % high school educated, unemployment rate, % employed in agriculture, mafia-presence index (2006), vote share in women related referenda, turnout and vote share of the right-wing coalition in the most recent parliamentary election.

No Differential Corruption

- Using corruption charges. ▸ Results

- Using fishy procurement practices.
  - Bunching, Subcontracting, Non-negotiated procedures ▸ Results

- Effect not driven by mafia areas or mafia-perpetrated attacks.
  ▸ Not Driven by Criminal Attacks

Explaining the Gender Differential in Attacks

Identity?

Identity-driven violence

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    ⇒ Not supported: same rate of attacks where
        - Voted against abortion and divorce ▸ Referenda
        - Low female labor force participation ▸ Female Labor

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- Violence where women are most empowered.
  - Expectation: ↑ violence where women are more empowered politically and occupy positions in office.

Driven by Municipalities with Gender Quotas

Panel A: Extensive Margin

RDD Coeff: 0.47
p-value: 0.003
Region FEs: Yes
Election Year FEs: Yes
Controls: Yes
Bandwidth: 16.42
N Left: 423
N Right: 327

RDD Coeff: -0.05
p-value: 0.636
Region FEs: Yes
Election Year FEs: Yes
Controls: Yes
Bandwidth: 18.22
N Left: 1494
N Right: 1100

RDD Effect of Electing Female Mayor

● Gender Quotas   □ No Gender Quotas

with More Women Elected in Council

Panel B: Women in Municipal Council

RDD Coeff: 0.40
p-value: 0.010
Region FEs: Yes
Election Year FEs: Yes
Controls: Yes
Bandwidth: 16.22
N Left: 482
N Right: 324

RDD Coeff: -0.07
p-value: 0.784
Region FEs: Yes
Election Year FEs: Yes
Controls: Yes
Bandwidth: 18.06
N Left: 191
N Right: 173

● Female Councillors >= Median   □ Female Councillors < Median

where Female Presence Has Been Growing

Panel C: Growth of Female Share in Municipal Council

Quintiles of Growth in Women's Representation
● q=1   ■ q=2   ▲ q=3   ◆ q=4   × q=5

Note: Growth from 1993 to election under consideration.

where there is a Female Regional President

Panel C: Female Regional President

RDD Coeff: 0.89
p-value: 0.004
Region FEs: Yes
Election Year FEs: Yes
Controls: Yes
Bandwidth: 11.95
N Left: 20
N Right: 21

RDD Coeff: 0.34
p-value: 0.020
Region FEs: Yes
Election Year FEs: Yes
Controls: Yes
Bandwidth: 18.53
N Left: 726
N Right: 508

RDD Effect of Electing Female Mayor

● Female President   □ No Female President

Double Standards in Judgement?

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
Double Standards in Judgement?

- Are female mayors judged more harshly for the same mistakes?
- Female mayors have comparable qualities and performances.
- But they might face more hostility for the same low quality/performance as males.
- We use 4 measures: budget surplus (Carreri, 2021), education, skills, and political dynasty.

Bad Female Mayors Are Punished More than Bad Male Mayors

Recap

(No) Women are not targeted based on their actions.

(No) Violence is not explained by restrictive gender norms.

(Yes) Backlash against a large and $\uparrow$ female presence in power.

(Yes) Double standards in the judgement of women in power.

Consequences of Violence

Consequences of Violence

- On policymaking

- On political persistence
    - While in office – resignation.
    - After term – rerunning.

Effect of Attacks on Policymaking

Do women adjust their policies more after an attack?

Effect of Attacks on Policymaking

Do women adjust their policies more after an attack?

$$Policies_{i,y,t} = \delta_{i \times t} + \rho_y + \psi PostAttack_{i,y} + \gamma (PostAttack * Female)_{i,y,t} + \epsilon_{i,y,t}$$

Effect of Attacks on Policymaking

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
Expenditures

Corruption

▸ Null Effect on Resignations

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If attacks are aimed at political suppression of women, they should target women who can re-run for office.

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Panel A: Indicator for >= 1 Attack

RDD Coeff: 0.43
p-value: 0.002
Region FEs: Yes
Election Year FEs: Yes
Controls: Yes
Bandwidth: 18.60
N Left: 584
N Right: 423

RDD Coeff: -0.03
p-value: 0.860
Region FEs: Yes
Election Year FEs: Yes
Controls: Yes
Bandwidth: 14.39
N Left: 122
N Right: 87

RDD Effect of Electing Female Mayor

● Term Limited   □ Not Term Limited

Attacked Female Mayors Less Likely to Re-Run

	(1)
	All Mayors
Female Mayor	.000
(RDD coeff)	(.043)
Mean Depvar	.431
SD Depvar	.495
Region FEs	Yes
Controls	Yes
Bandwidth	22.67
Effective N	1,536

Notes: The sample only includes mayors not subject to term limits.

Attacked Female Mayors Less Likely to Re-Run

	(1)	(2)
	All Mayors	*Not Attacked*
Female Mayor	.000	.039
(RDD coeff)	(.043)	(.051)
Mean Depvar	.431	.440
SD Depvar	.495	.497
Region FEs	Yes	Yes
Controls	Yes	Yes
Bandwidth	22.67	16.95
Effective N	1,536	1,093

Notes: The sample only includes mayors not subject to term limits.

Attacked Female Mayors Less Likely to Re-Run

	(1)	(2)	(3)
	All Mayors	*Not Attacked*	*Attacked*
Female Mayor	.000	.039	-.487***
(RDD coeff)	(.043)	(.051)	(.124)
Mean Depvar	.431	.440	.552
SD Depvar	.495	.497	.506
Region FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls	Yes	Yes	No
Bandwidth	22.67	16.95	12.95
Effective N	1,536	1,093	74

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If no attack took place, there would be zero gap in female selection out of office

Conclusions

- First causal evidence of a gender gap in violence against politicians.

- Logic behind attacks: identity (and not policy) motives.
  - → Violence as a tool to preserve men's hegemony over political power (Bardall et al., 2020).

- Consequences: discouraging women from rerunning.
  - → Gender gap in violence ↑ gender gap in representation.
  - → Gap in selection *out* (not only into) politics.

- Targeted policies protecting women in politics are important for victims, representation, and democracy.

Thank You!

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Appendix

Additional Results

- Types and targets ▶
- McCrary ▶
- Balance ▶
- TWFE ▶
- Other victims ▶
- Lag Attacks ▶
- Reporting bias ▶
- Jackknife ▶
- Public vs Private ▶
- Sexist attacks ▶
- Online attacks ▶
- Expenditures: Year 1 ▶
- Share Total ▶
- Financial Performance ▶
- Corruption ▶
- Procurement ▶
- Mafia ▶
- Criminal Attacks ▶
- Referenda ▶
- Female Labor Force ▶
- Resignations ▶
- Previous Mayor ▶

What is Avviso Pubblico?

- An NGO, founded in 1996, aimed at improving lawfulness and transparency in public administration.

- Among other initiatives, it has hundreds of staff members daily checking offline and online newspapers for news on attacks to public administrators.

- While not coming from a governmental source, its reports have been used to inform policymaking in recent years.

▸ Back

Number of Attacks

# Targets of attacks

Number of Attacks

Examples of Reports

23 APRIL 2015 – CAPACI (Palermo) – *A threatening letter was sent to the mailbox of Vicemayor Roberto Tarallo. The letter says "You are going to die" and "You will end up like the mayor of Partinico". Mr. Tarallo, when denouncing the episode to the authorities, hypothesized that the threat might refer to the issue of waste management in the municipality.*

19 DECEMBER 2016 – CROSIA (Cosenza) *Threat to the Public Works Aldermen, Mr. Saverio Capristo. His car, parked in front of his house, was set on fire during the night.*

Note: Original reports in Italian, translation is our won.

Density Tests

Left: McCrary (2008). Right: Cattaneo et al. (2016).

Covariates Balance at Cutoff

Dependent Variable	$\hat{\beta}$	(SE)	Dependent Variable	$\hat{\beta}$	(SE)
Log Surface	-.191	(.224)	Anti-Women VS Referenda	-.017*	(.009)
Log Longitude	.003	(.007)	Anti-Abortion VS	-.001	(.005)
Log Latitude	-.001	(.001)	Abortion Restriction VS	-.025**	(.012)
Log Elevation	-.070	(.146)	Anti-Divorce VS	-.025	(.016)
Provincial Capital	-.019	(.022)	Mafia Dissolutions (Pre 2006)	-.003	(.013)
Log Km from Reg. Capital	-.030	(.099)	Mafia Seizures (Pre 2006)	.070	(.053)
Log Population	-.009	(.093)	Mafia Killings (Pre 2006)	.001	(.028)
Pop. Above 10,000	.015	(.072)	Log Transcrime Index	-.004	(.013)
Pop. Above 15,000	.006	(.060)	Mayor Independent (t-1)	-.016	(.088)
Log Population Density	.127	(.134)	Mayor Far Left (t-1)	.058	(.060)
Log Foreigners x 100 Inhab.	.016	(.080)	Mayor Far Right (t-1)	.019	(.034)
Had SPRAR	-.026	(.031)	Mayor Left (t-1)	-.043	(.040)
Average Age	.424	(.321)	Mayor Right (t-1)	.024	(.044)
% High School	-.004	(.006)	Mayor Aligned Nat. (t-1)	-.033	(.033)
% Unemployed	-.001	(.003)	Mayor Aligned Reg. (t-1)	-.063	(.057)
% Youth Unemployed	-.001	(.009)	Mayor Nat. Party (t-1)	-.058	(.058)
% Agriculture	-.003	(.007)	Mayor College (t-1)	-.094	(.060)
% Industry	.001	(.011)	Mayor Local (t-1)	.083	(.070)
N. of Candidates	-.020	(.231)	Mayor's Age (t-1)	-.604	(1.291)
N. of Councillors	-.067	(.720)	Mayor's Education (t-1)	-0.252	(.005)
Turnout National Election	.006	(.004)	Mayor High Skilled (t-1)	-.026	(.446)
VS Center Right	.001	(.010)	Mayor Male (t-1)	.005	(.065)

TWFE Results: Attacks to Mayor

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	≥ 1 Attack		Ln(Attacks)		InvHSin(Attacks)	
Female Mayor	.035***	.037***	.026***	.028***	.033**	.035***
	(.011)	(.011)	(.010)	(.010)	(.013)	(.013)
Mean Depvar	.088	.089	.074	.075	.096	.097
SD Depvar	.284	.285	.252	.254	.326	.328
Municipality FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Election-Year FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Observations	8,026	7,903	8,026	7,903	8,026	7,903

Controls: Log population, log population density, log foreign residents per 100 inhabitants, average age, % high-school educated, unemployment rate, % employed in agriculture, turnout and vote share of the right-wing coalition in the most recent parliamentary election.

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Placebo with Other Victims

*Notes*: Dependent variables are standardized.

Placebo with Lag of Attacks

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	≥ 1 Attack		Ln(Attacks)		InvHSin(Attacks)	
Female Mayor	.000	-.006	-.012	-.018	-.016	-.024
	(.032)	(.030)	(.027)	(.025)	(.035)	(.033)
Mean Depvar	.076	.076	.063	.063	.082	.080
SD Depvar	.265	.265	.236	.237	.306	.306
Region FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Bandwidth	22.73	23.00	19.60	18.70	19.47	18.55
Effective N	1,479	1,456	1,303	1,231	1,297	1,225
N Left	899	889	771	725	765	719
N Right	580	567	532	506	532	506

Controls: Log surface, log longitude, log latitude, log elevation, log distance from regional capital, log population, log population density, log foreigners per 100 inhabitants, indicator for provincial capital, average age, % high school educated, unemployment rate, % employed in agriculture, mafia-presence index (2006), vote share in women related referenda, turnout and vote share of the right-wing coalition in the most recent parliamentary election.

Placebo with Irrelevant Cutoffs

Panel A: Indicator for >= 1 Attack

Robustness to Alternative Bandwidths

Panel A: Indicator for >= 1 Attack

Robustness: MLE for Intensive Margin

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Poisson Regression		Negative Binomial	
Female Mayor	1.502***	1.314***	1.521***	1.402***
	(.441)	(.379)	(.413)	(.379)
SD Depvar	.198	.200	.169	.169
Region FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls	No	Yes	No	Yes
Bandwidth	17.96	21.08	17.96	21.08
Observations	1,163	1,328	1,163	1,163

Controls: Log surface, log longitude, log latitude, log elevation, log distance from regional capital, log population, log population density, log foreigners per 100 inhabitants, indicator for provincial capital, average age, % high school educated, unemployment rate, % employed in agriculture, mafia-presence index (2006), vote share in women related referenda, turnout and vote share of the right-wing coalition in the most recent parliamentary election.

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Not Driven by Any Single Region

Panel A: Regions

Not Driven by Any Single Year

Panel B: Election Years

Robustness: Excluding Attacks Denounced

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	≥ 1 Attack		Ln(Attacks)		InvHSin(Attacks)	
Female Mayor	.114***	.122***	.090***	.098***	.116***	.126***
	(.034)	(.032)	(.028)	(.026)	(.036)	(.034)
Mean Depvar	.048	.047	.037	.039	.048	.048
SD Depvar	.214	.212	.178	.181	.230	.230
Bandwidth	17.31	17.50	17.11	17.36	17.12	17.10
Effective N	1,219	1,197	1,205	1,187	1,206	1,172
N Left	711	699	702	692	703	682
N Right	508	498	503	495	503	490

Controls: Log surface, log longitude, log latitude, log elevation, log distance from regional capital, log population, log population density, log foreigners per 100 inhabitants, indicator for provincial capital, average age, % high school educated, unemployment rate, % employed in agriculture, mafia-presence index (2006), vote share in women related referenda, turnout and vote share of the right-wing coalition in the most recent parliamentary election.

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Robustness: Excluding Sexist Attacks

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	$\geq$ 1 Attack		Ln(Attacks +1)		InvHSin(Attacks)	
Female Mayor	.082**	.088***	.062**	.068***	.080**	.088***
	(.034)	(.033)	(.027)	(.026)	(.034)	(.033)
Mean Depvar	.047	.047	.037	.040	.047	.052
SD Depvar	.211	.212	.180	.191	.232	.247
Region FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Election-Year FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Bandwidth	18.51	18.68	17.16	17.69	17.13	17.69
Effective N	1,296	1,271	1,207	1,210	1,206	1,210
N Left	760	748	704	709	703	709
N Right	536	523	503	501	503	501

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Robustness: Excluding Online Attacks

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	≥ 1 Attack		Ln(Attacks +1)		InvHSin(Attacks)	
Female Mayor	.080***	.085***	.062**	.069***	.080**	.089***
	(.031)	(.030)	(.025)	(.024)	(.033)	(.031)
Mean Depvar	.040	.041	.033	.032	.042	.042
SD Depvar	.196	.197	.164	.162	.211	.210
Region FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Election-Year FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Bandwidth	18.14	18.26	17.67	18.06	17.68	18.31
Effective N	1,296	1,271	1,207	1,210	1,206	1,210
N Left	760	748	704	709	703	709
N Right	536	523	503	501	503	501

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Public vs. Private Attacks

Panel B: Attacks in Public vs. Private Space

RDD Coeff: 0.22
p-value: 0.097
Region FEs: Yes
Election Year FEs: Yes
Controls: Yes
Bandwidth: 22.59
N Left: 930
N Right: 600

RDD Coeff: 0.32
p-value: 0.029
Region FEs: Yes
Election Year FEs: Yes
Controls: Yes
Bandwidth: 17.37
N Left: 713
N Right: 508

● Public Space   □ Private Space

Notes: Dependent variables are standardized.

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No Difference in Year 1

Panel A: Log Per Capita Expenditures

No Difference with Share Total Expenditures

Panel B: Share of Total Expenditures

No Difference in Financial Performance

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Large Excess of Budget Surplus		*Log Liabilities Accumulated*		*Dependency on External Finance*	
Female Mayor	-.036	-.030	.006	.012	.022	.030
	(.053)	(.051)	(.020)	(.021)	(.018)	(.018)
Mean Depvar	.682	.678	.472	.467	.065	.067
SD Depvar	.466	.468	.163	.169	.107	.110
Region FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Election-Year FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Bandwidth	16.98	18.73	22.44	16.76	17.03	14.53
Effective N	1,119	1,273	1,009	760	565	486
N Left	691	749	613	440	327	268
N Right	500	524	396	320	238	218

No Effect of Female Mayors on Corruption Charges

|	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Count of Corruption Charges		Charges per 1,000 Inhabitants		Charges per 1Mil EUR Spent	
Female Mayor	1.353*	1.130	-.014	-.007	-.003	-.002
	(.763)	(1.005)	(.019)	(.018)	(.003)	(.003)
Mean Depvar	1.34	.924	.056	.055	.009	.057
SD Depvar	1.34	.924	.056	.055	.009	.057
Region FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Bandwidth	13.83	8.95	19.08	18.86	21.73	18.35
Effective N	492	310	644	627	711	609
N Left	274	154	382	373	430	362
N Right	218	156	262	254	281	247

Controls: Log surface, log longitude, log latitude, log elevation, log distance from regional capital, log population, log population density, log foreigners per 100 inhabitants, indicator for provincial capital, average age, % high school educated, unemployment rate, % employed in agriculture, mafia-presence index (2006), vote share in women related referenda, turnout and vote share of the right-wing coalition in the most recent parliamentary election.

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Little Effect of Female Mayors on Procurement Practices

|	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Bunching of Contract Values		Log N. of Firms Invited		Probability of Subcontracting	
Female Mayor	.024*	.022	-.013	-.010	-.032*	-.036**
	(.013)	(.014)	(.097)	(.093)	(.018)	(.018)
Mean Depvar	-.020	-.020	1.68	1.68	.103	.104
SD Depvar	.109	.111	.823	.818	.154	.152
Region FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Bandwidth	20.77	19.16	20.95	22.19	17.65	16.61
Effective N	1,416	1,293	1,206	1,239	1,192	1,096
N Left	848	763	721	746	695	626
N Right	568	530	485	493	497	470

Controls: Log surface, log longitude, log latitude, log elevation, log distance from regional capital, log population, log population density, log foreigners per 100 inhabitants, indicator for provincial capital, average age, % high school educated, unemployment rate, % employed in agriculture, mafia-presence index (2006), vote share in women related referenda, turnout and vote share of the right-wing coalition in the most recent parliamentary election.

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Not Driven by Mafia Affected Areas

Panel A: Mafia Presence in Municipality

RDD Coeff: 0.43
p-value: 0.022
Region FEs: Yes
Election Year FEs: Yes
Controls: Yes
Bandwidth: 18.65
N Left: 594
N Right: 423

RDD Coeff: 0.42
p-value: 0.125
Region FEs: Yes
Election Year FEs: Yes
Controls: Yes
Bandwidth: 14.30
N Left: 135
N Right: 103

● No Mafia   □ Mafia

Notes: Dependent variables are standardized.

# Not Driven by Criminal Attacks

Notes: Dependent variables are standardized.

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# Voting in referenda for divorce and abortion

Female Labor Force Participation

Had Previously Elected a Female Mayor

Effect on Resignations

Do women resign at higher rates after an attack?