Research

My papers have appeared in (among others) the Economic Journal, the Review of Economics and Statistics, the Journal of Politics, the Journal of Development Economics, and the Journal of Public Economics. My book in Italian, Fallimento Lockdown, with Piero Stanig, was published in September 2021, and in the same year, has been among the best-selling books in the "political science" and "economics" categories on Amazon.it.

Work in Progress

Women Behind Bars: Do Female-Only Prisons Reduce Recidivism?

We investigate the causal effect on female recidivism of serving a sentence in prisons that are designed to house only female inmates rather than in those that predominantly house male inmates and thus are mixed-gender. We look at Italy, where both female-only and mixed- gender prisons coexist. The first accommodates around 30% of female inmates. Since inmates are preferentially allocated to the prison closest to their residence, we use the difference between the distances from the residence and the closest mixed-gender or female-only facilities as an instrument to approximate a quasi-random assignment. We use confidential data on individual inmates from 2012 to 2022 and we find that female-only prisons lower recidivism among women. A possible mechanism is that detention structures accommodating only female inmates can be more easily customized around their needs and allow more effective rehabilitation initiatives

with F. Calamunci, G. Mastrobuoni and D. Terlizzese

Working Papers

A Few Bad Apples? Criminal Charges, Political Careers, and Policy Outcomes

We study the prevalence and effects of individuals with past criminal charges among electoral candidates and appointed politicians in Brazil. Individuals with past criminal charges are twice as likely to run for election and to be elected than other individuals. Such a difference holds across all political parties and government levels, and is unaffected when conditioning the comparison on a wide array of observable characteristics. Randomized anti-corruption audits reduce the share of mayors with previous criminal charges, but only when they are conducted in electoral years whereas audits conducted in other periods have no effect. Using a regression discontinuity design based on close elections, we find that the election of mayors with criminal charges negatively impacts public health. This is evidenced by higher rates of underweight births and increased infant mortality. Additionally, we observe a rise in political patronage, particularly within the health sector, which aligns with the detrimental effects on public health.

Working Paper, with D. Britto, M. Le Moglie, P. Pinotti and B. Sampaio

Fiscal Rules, Corruption and Electoral Accountability

In this paper, we study how policies limiting the spending capacity of local governments may lead to a reduction in corruption. We exploit the extension of one such policy, the Domestic Stability Pact (DSP), to Italian municipalities with less than 5,000 inhabitants that occurred in 2013. Using a ‘local Difference-in-Differences’ approach, we show that the extension of the DSP led to a substantial decrease in recorded corruption rates. This effect emerges only in areas in which the DSP put a binding cap on municipal capital expenditures, in line with the hypothesis that investments and procurement are naturally prone to corruptive phenomena. We also show that i) the reduction in corruption is linked to accountability incentives; ii) and it is not just a mechanical consequence of the decrease in investments, by pointing out evidence of an improvement in the corruption-proofness of public spending. We then estimate the impact of the extension of the DSP on local welfare, finding a null effect. Overall, our findings suggest that budget constrains might induce local governments to curb expenditures in a way that dampens their exposure to corruption without depressing local welfare.

Previously titled "Corruption under Austerity", with T. Giommoni accepted on Journal of Politics

Attacking Women or their Policies? Understanding Violence against Women in Politics

Surveys across countries indicate that female politicians are more often targets of violence compared to males. Why are women attacked more? Is this due to their gender, or to correlated factors? We provide the first causal evidence that violence is driven by gender: leveraging 12 years of data on attacks against Italian politicians, we show that marginally elected female mayors, similar in all respects to their male colleagues, are attacked three times more. We argue that violence can stem from two distinct sources: identity-based motives and divergent policymaking. Attacks concentrate where female empowerment in politics is highest, consistent with a misogynistic backlash hypothesis. Instead, there are no gender differences in expenditures and corruption, indicating that women's policies do not motivate attacks. Violence can have pernicious consequences: female mayors are less likely to rerun for office after an attack, underscoring how violence may foster the persistence of the political gender gap.

Working Paper,with G. Dipoppa and M. Pulejo

Mafia, Politics and Machine Predictions

Detection is one of the main challenges in the fight against organized crime. We show that machine learning can be used to predict mafias infiltration in Italian local governments, as measured by the dismissal of city councils infiltrated by organized crime. The model successfully predicts up to 96% of out-of-sample municipalities previously identified as infiltrated by mafias, up to two years earlier, making this index a valuable tool for identifying municipalities at risk of infiltration well in advance. Furthermore, we can identify "high-risk" local governments that may be infiltrated by organized crime but have not been detected by the state, thereby improving the efficacy of detection. We then apply this new time-varying measure of organized crime to investigate the underlying causes of this type of rent-seeking. As criminals infiltrate politics to capture public resources, we study how a positive shock in public spending (European Union transfers), affects this phenomenon. Employing a geographic Difference-in-Discontinuities design, we find a substantial and lasting increase in the predicted risk of mafia infiltration (up to 14 p.p.), emphasizing the unintended effects of delivering aid where criminal organizations can appropriate public funds.

Working Paper, with G. Campedelli and M. Le Moglie

Externalities and the Erosion of Trust

We present a theory linking political and social trust to explain trust erosion in modern societies. Individuals disagree on the seriousness of an externality problem, which leads to diverging policy opinions on how to solve it. This heterogeneity has two important effects on trust. First, disappointment with the policy rule enacted by the government breeds institutional distrust. Individuals that are more worried blame the government because the rule is too lenient. The less worried blame it even more because it is too intrusive. Second, as the rule also shapes individuals’ notion of civic behavior, it drives a wedge between what an individual expects from others and their actual behavior. This fuels social distrust. The more individuals are worried, the more they distrust others that are not complying with the rules. Our experimental survey conducted in four European countries shows how these trust dynamics came to the surface during the Covid-19 pandemic. Once led to think intensely about the virus, lower institutional trust was reported predominantly by respondents that were less worried about the virus, whereas social trust declined (more) for worried individuals. We lastly find that support for the welfare state erodes alongside sliding trust levels.

Working Paper (previously Wind of Change? Experimental Survey Evidence on the COVID19 Shock and Socio-Political Attitudes in Europe), with A. Martinangeli, F. Passarelli, W. Sas and L. Windsteiger

Publications

1. Fuelling Organised Crime: Oil Thefts and the Mexican Drug War
with G. Battiston, M. Le Moglie and P. Pinotti, Economic Journal (2024)

2. The Causal Impact of Pandemic Distress on Anti-Immigration Sentiments
with A. Martinangeli, F. Passarelli, W. Sas and L. Windsteiger, Economica (2024)

3. Does the winner take it all? Redistributive Policies and Political Extremism
with A. Piolatto and W. Sas, Regional Science and Urban Economics (2024)

4. Organized Crime, Violence and Support for the State
with G. Campedelli, A. Martinangeli and P. Pinotti, Journal of Public Economics (2023)

5. Pains, Guns and Moves: The Eﬀect of the US Opioid Epidemic on Mexican Migration
with M. Le Moglie and F. Masera  Journal of Development Economics (2023)

6. Never Forget the First Time: The Persistent Effects of Corruption and the Rise of Populism in Italy
with A. Aassve and M. Le Moglie Journal of Politics (2023)

7. Doing Business Below the Line: Screening, Mafias and European Funds
with G. Dipoppa The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization (2022)

8. Dynasties and Policymaking
with A. Romarri, P. Vertier  Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization (2021)

9. Street vendors, incentives and self-regulation: a field study in urban India
with D. Tommasi , S. Mookerjee, The Review of Economics and Statistics (2020)

10. Abandon Ship? Party Brands and Politicians' Responses to a Political Scandal
with S. Galletta , B. Geys on Journal of Public Economics (2020)

11. Popularity shocks and political selection: The effects of anti-corruption audits on candidates’ quality
with F. Cavalcantii, S. Galletta, Journal of Public Economics (2018)

12. Mafia, Elections and Political Violence
with G. Dipoppa, Journal of Public Economics (2017)

13. Strike one to educate one hundred: Organized crime, political selection and politicians’ ability
Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization (2017)

14. Organised Crime, Institutions and Political Quality: Empirical Evidence from Italian Municipalities
with B. Geys, The Economic Journal (2015)

15. The Strength of Weak (Family) Ties: Family Networks in High vs. Low Income Countries
with B. Geys, Journal of Development Studies (2015)

16. Interpersonal trust and welfare state support
with B. Geys, European Journal of Political Economy (2015)

17. Public support for European fiscal integration in times of crisis
with B. Geys, Journal of European Public Policy (2015)

Books

"Fallimento Lookdown", with P. Stanig, EGEA Bocconi Editore (2021)

Book Chapters

"Organised violence: The Mafia" in The Handbook of Collective Violence: Current Developments and Understanding." (2020), ROUTLEDGE.

Old Working Papers

Toxic Loans and the Entry of Extreme Candidates

The role of financial crises in boosting populism has been well documented. Yet the specific mechanisms through which this occurs remain elusive. This paper studies how populist candidacies were fueled by a case of public financial mismanagement, which became salient during the Great Recession. Using an instrumental variable strategy, we exploit the leak of a list of French municipalities that contracted “toxic” loans before the crisis. During the subsequent municipal elections, we show that i) the right-wing populist party is the only political orientation experiencing an increase in vote share, while mainstream incumbents' political orientations are electorally punished, ii) both right-wing and left-wing populist candidacies are more likely in municipalities affected by the scandal, leading to a rise in electoral competition, iii) the entry of populist candidates remains persistent over time. Importantly, the findings are not driven by economic deprivation, austerity measures, or pure demand for a political turnover. They suggest that the disclosure of public financial mismanagement contributes by itself to the rise of populism during financial crises via the strategic entry of populist parties.

Working Paper, with E. Sartre