Strike one to educate one hundred: Organized crime, political selection and politicians’ ability, Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 2019

In this paper, I show that criminal organizations may affect political(self-)selection by discouraging high-ability individuals from entering politics.

Identification derives from murders of local politicians by criminal organizations, and indicates thatsuch a negative shock to politicians’ expected payoffs induces a strong decrease in electedpoliticians’ human capital.

The effect is not limited to the municipality in which a politicalmurder takes place, but also extends to nearby municipalities.

Published Version  - Free Version

Presentations:

• 2015 SIRE Workshop on the Economics of Organized Crime (Glasgow, UK);  Bank of Italy UIF - Bocconi Workshop “Quantitative methods and the fight against economic crime 2017” (Rome, IT, 2017); 
• Presentation at the Italian Senate of the paper “Mafia, Elections and Political Violence”, related to the activities of the Parliamentary Commission, “Commissione sulle intimidazioni agli amministratori locali”

Media:

• The Conversation (US), Chicago Tribune(US),  The Local (US), Matamata Politik (Indonesia) ​